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 3  T.D. 9564, Dec. 23, 2011, 2012-2 C.B. 614, corrected March 
28,	2012	and	Dec.	19,	2012.
 4  See	 generally,	Harl,	 “Temporary	Regulations	 on	Repairs,	
Depreciation	and	Capitalization,”	23	Agric. L. Dig. 41 (2012).
 5  See the Preamble to T.D. 9636, Sept. 13, 2013, 2013-2 C.B. 
331,	under	the	heading	of	“Explanation	of	Provisions,”	section	
VI(D)(2)(E),		for	a	brief	discussion	of	a	“safe	harbor”	for	small	
taxpayers. Note that Preambles merely provide an explanation 
of	what	is	in	the	regulations	and	have	no	legal	status.	In	the	last	
paragraph under (E) mention is made of a safe harbor for building 
property	held	by	“small	taxpayers”	but	there	is	no	mention	of	a	
definition	for	“small	taxpayer”	and	the	language	mentions	only	
“buildings.”	It	does	allude	to		a	tax	return	filing	rather	than	a	Form	
3115	filing	but	in	the	context	only	for	“buildings.”
 6  2014-1 C.B. 606.
 7		2014-2	C.B.	675	(which	is	62	pages	in	length).
 8		2014-1 C.B. 606.
 9  2014-2 C.B. 675.
 10  2014-2	C.B.	675.
 11  2014-2	C.B.	675.
 12  T.D. 9636, Sept. 13, 2013, 2013-2 C.B. 331, corrected July 
18,	2014.
 13  2014-1 C.B. 606.
 14  2014-2	C.B.	675.
Rev. Proc. 2014-5411 goes on to state that a taxpayer (including 
a	 qualified	 taxpayer	 (referred	 to	 as	 a	 “qualifying	 taxpayer”)	
must attach to Form 3115 (a) a statement with a description of 
the	assets	to	which	the	change	applies	(e.g.,	“all	5-year	property	
placed	 in	 service	 	 in	 2009	 in	Holmdel,	New	 Jersey,”	 	 (b)	 a	
statement attached to the Form 3115 a description of the general 
asset account to which the change applies, (c) a statement that 
the	taxpayer	agrees	to	specified	additional	terms	and	conditions	
of the relevant statutes involved and (d) a statement that the 
election	made	“.	 .	 .	 is	 irrevocable	and	will	be	binding	on	the	
taxpayer for computing taxable income for the year of change 
and for all subsequent years with respect to the assets that are 
subject	to	the	election.”	
In conclusion
	 It	 is	clear	that	compliance	with	the	final	regulations,12 Rev. 
Proc. 2014-1613 and Rev. Proc. 2014-5414	is	a	not	an	insignificant	
task,	especially	the	first	time	through	the	procedure.	One	wonders	
if	all	of	this	complexity	is	justified	in	light	of	–	(1)	the	trend	to	
allow a write-off of a substantial part of the income tax basis in 
the	first	year,	with	the	trend	toward	minimizing	depreciation;	and	
(2) the taxpayer and tax practitioner time necessary to comply 
fully with the published authorities.
ENDNOTES
 1  T.D. 9636, Sept. 13, 2013, 2013-2 C.B. 331, corrected July 
18,	2014.
 2  T.D. 9564, Dec. 23, 2011, 2012-2 C.B. 614, corrected March 
28,	2012	and	Dec.	19,	2012.
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ANIMALS
 HORSES. The plaintiff was injured when the plaintiff’s 
motorcycle struck a horse owned by the defendant. The plaintiff 
sought recovery in negligence by the defendant for failing to 
secure the horse. The trial jury awarded medical damages to the 
plaintiff but reduced the award by 49 percent for contributory 
negligence. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the jury instruction 
on contributory negligence should not have been given and that the 
award	was	inadequate.	The	appellate	court	first	noted	that	drivers	
have a duty to keep a proper lookout. The court noted that there 
was substantial evidence that other motorcyclists riding with the 
plaintiff saw the horse, and other loose horses, and were able to 
avoid them. Finally, the court pointed to evidence that the plaintiff 
had visited several bars during the day while traveling with the 
group	of	motorcyclists.	 	All	this	evidence	was	sufficient	to	give	
the contributory negligence instruction to the jury which was 
responsible for weighing the evidence to determine whether the 
plaintiff’s	actions	contributed	to	the	accident;	therefore,	the	jury	
instruction	and	final	determination	were	within	the	range	findings	
from the evidence presented. The plaintiff also argued that the 
damage award was inadequate because it provided no compensation 
for pain and suffering. The appellate court noted that the evidence 
showed that the plaintiff left the scene prior to the arrival of medical 
help, did not seek treatment until the next day and did not complete 
physical therapy recommended by a doctor. The appellate court held 
that	such	evidence	was	sufficient	for	the	jury	to	determine	that	there	
was no more than de minimis or no pain and suffering. Macias v. 
Bader, 2014 Neb. App. LEXIS 206 (Neb. Ct. App. 2014).
 The plaintiff sought to purchase a horse from one of the defendants. 
The plaintiff visited the horse at the defendant trainer’s stable. The 
plaintiff was told that the horse required an experienced rider and the 
plaintiff told the trainer that the plaintiff was an experienced rider. 
The plaintiff wanted to ride the horse and the trainer suggested that 
the plaintiff remove the riding spurs the plaintiff was wearing but the 
plaintiff	refused.	In	attempting	to	mount	the	horse,	the	horse	spun	
and threw the plaintiff off. The horse was exercised a bit and the 
plaintiff removed the spurs. However, when the plaintiff mounted 
the horse, the horse immediately bucked the plaintiff off, resulting 
injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants 
based on the immunity granted by the Ohio Equine Liability Law, 
Ohio Rev. Stat. § 2305.321 et seq. On appeal, the plaintiff argued 
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CONTRACTS
 RESTRAINING ORDER. The plaintiffs entered into oral 
contracts for the operation of their horse breeding business by 
the defendants for three years while the plaintiffs were working 
outside	the	United	States.	The	plaintiffs	filed	suit	alleging	that	the	
defendants materially breached those oral contracts by botching 
sales, advertising, and breeding contracts, failing to adequately 
care for the horses, and diverting business to other horses. The 
complaint also alleged tortious interference with advantageous 
business relationships or prospective economic relations and 
violations	of	the	Michigan	Usury	Act.	Additionally,	an	accounting	
was requested because the parties dispute the amount of money 
the plaintiffs owe for the defendants’ boarding and other services. 
Before the plaintiffs could serve the complaint on the defendants, 
the defendants planned a sheriff’s sale of all the horses, worth 
over $600,000, to cover $26,000 of costs claimed to be owed. The 
plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order to prevent the sale. 
The court granted the restraining order because (1) the sale would 
cause irreparable harm to the plaintiffs, (2) the restraining order 
would	not	significantly	harm	the	defendants,	(3)	there	is	a	strong	
public interest in enforcing valid contracts and fair treatment of 
animals, and (4) the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of 
success of their claims, although subject to claims of the defendants. 
Auld MacDonald Farms Arabians v. Twin Creek Farms, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178636 (W.D. Mich. 2014).
FEDERAL FARM
PROGRAMS
 FARM LOANS. The	FSA	 has	 adopted	 as	 final	 regulations	
amending the Farm Loan Programs (FLP) loan making and 
servicing	 regulations	 to	 reflect	 several	 changes	 required	 by	 the	
2014 Farm Bill. The changes were implemented administratively 
upon	the	passage	of	the	2014	Farm	Bill;	this	rule	makes	conforming	
amendments in the FSA regulations. The changes include: 
increasing	the	percent	of	guarantee	for	conservation	loans;	reducing	
the interest rate for direct Farm Ownership (FO) loans made under 
a	joint	financing	arrangement;	eliminating	the	oil,	gas,	and	mineral	
appraisal	requirement;	increasing	the	maximum	loan	amount	for	a	
direct	FO	loan	made	under	the	downpayment	program;	eliminating	
the	 rural	 residency	 requirement	 for	 the	 rural	 youth	 loans	 (YL);	
allowing	 a	 borrower	who	 had	YL	 debt	 forgiveness	 to	 receive	
future	government	loans	under	certain	circumstances;	excluding	
microloans (ML) to beginning or veteran farmers from the existing 
operating loans (OL) term limitations, and add a special ML interest 
rate	available	 to	beginning	and	veteran	farmers;	eliminating	 the	
term	 limit	 for	 guaranteed	OLs;	 and	 amending	 the	 definition	 of	
a beginning farmer, increasing the maximum owned acreage 
requirement. 79 Fed. Reg. 78689 (Dec. 31, 2014).
that the exception provided in Ohio Rev. Stat. § 2305.321(B)(2)(d) 
applied because the trainer exhibited wanton misconduct in that (1) 
the trainer had not ridden, lunged or tuned the horse out for normal 
exercise on the day of the incident, (2) it was normal to turn the 
horse	out	to	pasture	for	exercise	approximately	five	to	six	hours	per	
day, (3) the trainer knew very little if anything about the plaintiff’s 
riding ability, (4) any information the trainer might have obtained 
would probably have had no bearing on her allowing the plaintiff to 
get up on the horse, (5) the trainer allowed the plaintiff to get up on 
the horse after the plaintiff had fallen or been thrown off the horse 
once and (6) the trainer allowed the plaintiff to continue riding the 
horse without intervening even after the trainer claimed to have 
seen	the	plaintiff	“off	balance	[and]	not	having	a	good	seat.”	The	
court upheld the summary judgment because the trainer had given 
the plaintiff the information about the exercise status of the horse, 
the plaintiff refused to exercise the horse before attempting to ride, 
the plaintiff was asked to remove the spurs and did not comply, 
the	defendant	did	exercise	the	horse	after	the	first	incident,	and	the	
plaintiff was aware of the risks of riding an unknown horse. Dennis 
v. Nickajack Farms, Ltd., 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 5305 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2014).
BANkRUPTCy
FEDERAL TAX
 DISCHARGE.	The	 debtors,	 husband	 and	wife,	 had	 filed	 a	
Chapter	7	case	in	October	2010	and	the	debtors	received	a	discharge	
in February 2011.  The debtors had outstanding federal tax liabilities 
for	2000	and	2001	for	which	the	debtors	had	untimely	filed	Forms	
1040 in May 2005 after being assessed the taxes in November 2004. 
The issue was whether the May 2005 Forms 1040 constituted a return 
for purposes of Section 523(a)(1)(B)(i), allowing the discharge of 
the taxes reported.  The Bankruptcy Court ruled that a document is 
a	“return”	for	purposes	of	Section	523(a)(1)(B)(i)	if	the	document	
complies	with	“applicable	filing	requirements”	concerning	the	form	
and	contents	of	a	return,	the	place	and	manner	of	filing,	and	the	types	
or	classifications	of	taxpayers	that	are	required	to	file	returns,	and	
if it otherwise complies with requirements of nonbankruptcy law. 
The	Bankruptcy	Court	rejected	the	IRS	argument,	that	timeliness	
was	also	an	essential	“applicable	filing	requirement;”	therefore,	the	
May 2005 Forms 1040 were returns for purposes of Section 523(a)
(1)(B)(i) and the taxes properly reported therein were dischargeable. 
On appeal, the District Court reversed, holding that the untimely 
filed	returns	were	not	“returns”	for	purposes	of	Section	523(a)(1)
(B)(i)	because	the	filing	of	the	returns	served	no	purpose	since	the	
IRS	had	already	filed	assessments	in	November	2004.	On	further	
appeal,	the	appellate	court	affirmed. In re Mallo, 2015-1 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,129 (10th Cir. 2014), aff’g, 2013-2 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,628 (D.C. Colo. 2013), rev’g, 2012-2 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,674 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012).
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 LIVESTOCk MARkETING FACILITIES.	The	APHIS	has	
issued proposed regulations amending the regulations governing 
approval of facilities that receive livestock moved in interstate 
commerce. The proposed regulations include several amendments 
to the conditions under which livestock may move to such facilities 
without	official	 identification	or	prior	 issuance	of	 an	 interstate	
certificate	of	veterinary	inspection	or	alternative	documentation.	
80 Fed. Reg. 6 (Jan. 2, 2015).
 MARkETING ASSISTANCE LOANS. The FSA has adopted 
as	final	regulations	required	by	the	2014	Farm	Bill	to	update	the	
Marketing	Assistance	Loan	(MAL)	and	Loan	Deficiency	Payments	
(LDP) Programs for wheat, feed grains, soybeans, oilseeds, 
peanuts,	pulse	crops,	cotton,	honey,	wool	and	mohair.	In	general,	
the 2014 Farm Bill extends the existing programs with minor 
changes that are implemented in this rule, including a revised 
formula	for	upland	cotton	loan	rates.	The	final	rules	also	amend	
the	regulations	for	the	Economic	Adjustment	Assistance	for	Users	
of	Upland	Cotton	Program,	the	Extra	Long	Staple	(ELS)	Cotton	
Competitiveness Payment Program, and the Sugar Program to 
reflect	that	the	programs	were	extended	by	the	2014	Farm	Bill.	
80 Fed. Reg. 113 (Jan. 2, 2015).
 FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION
 FAILURE TO TIMELy FILE RETURN. The decedent died 
in	December	2008	and	the	taxpayer	was	appointed	executor.	The	
taxpayer hired an attorney to assist with administration of the estate 
who failed to tell the taxpayer that the attorney was suffering from 
brain cancer at the time. Although the taxpayer knew that an estate 
tax	return	was	due	by	September	30,	2009,	the	return	was	not	filed	
until	January	2011	and	the	IRS	assessed	a	late-filing	penalty	under	
I.R.C.	§	6651(a)(1)	and	for	late	payment	of	the	taxes	under	I.R.C.	
§ 6651(a)(2). The taxpayer presented evidence that the attorney 
suffered from an unknown disabling medical condition and that the 
attorney was disbarred for failing to properly advise the taxpayer 
and timely carry out the attorney’s duties. The taxpayer argued 
that the use of the attorney constituted reasonable cause and lack 
of	willful	neglect	in	failing	to	timely	file	and	pay	the	taxes.	The	
taxpayer	also	argued	 that	 the	 failure	 to	meet	 the	 tax	filing	and	
payment deadlines resulted from circumstances largely beyond 
the taxpayer’s control, the court held that there was no evidence 
to	support	a	finding	that	the	taxpayer	was	an	executor	without	the	
ability to control whether the deadline was met. The court held that 
reliance on counsel alone cannot constitute reasonable cause for 
the	late	filing	and	payment	of	taxes.	On	the	willful	neglect	issue	
the	court	defined	willful	neglect	as	“a	conscious,	intentional	failure	
or	reckless	indifference.”	However,	the	court	also	held	that	mere	
carelessness is enough for an executor to be subject to the late 
filing	and	tax	payment	penalties.	The	evidence	showed	that	the	
taxpayer had received several notices from the state and federal 
agencies	that	tax	returns	and	other	probate	filings	were	overdue,	
notices from family members as to the attorney’s incompetence, 
and	warnings	from	other	legal	counsel	of	the	need	to	find	new	
representation.  Thus, the court held that the taxpayer was well 
aware	of	the	deadlines	for	return	filings	and	tax	payment	and	the	
failure to act on those deadlines constituted willful neglect and 
subjected the estate to the assessed penalties. Specht v. United 
States, 2015-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,134 (S.D. Ohio 2015).
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION
 AMERICAN OPPORTUNITy CREDIT. The taxpayer s, 
husband	and	wife,	owned	an	I.R.C.	§	529	education	plan	for	
their child. The child enrolled in a community college in the 
fall	of	2010.	In	December	2010,	the	taxpayers	paid	the	tuition	
for the Spring 2011 semester from the Section 529 account. 
The taxpayers claimed the American Opportunity Credit for the 
tuition payment on their 2011 return. The taxpayers used cash 
method reporting on their joint 2011 return. The court ruled that 
I.R.C.	§	25A(g)(4)	contemplates	the	scenario	where,	as	here,	a	
taxpayer	prepays	qualified	tuition	and	related	expenses	during	
one taxable year for an academic period that begins during the 
first	three	months	of	the	following	taxable	year.	In	that	instance,	
I.R.C.	§	25A(g)(4)	provides	that	the	academic	period	is	treated	
as beginning during the taxable year in which payment was 
made. This provision therefore requires taxpayers to claim the 
credit with respect to the taxable year that the expenses were 
paid when the academic period begins in January, February, or 
March of the following year. Therefore, the court held that the 
taxpayers could not claim the tuition expenses paid in December 
2010 on their 2011 return. Ferm v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary 
Op. 2014-115.
 BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a lawyer who 
purchased a small airplane to travel for business and personal 
purposes. The taxpayer used the airplane for relatively short trips 
instead	of	a	car	to	avoid	traffic	in	the	city.		The	taxpayer	kept	a	
written	log	of	all	flights,	some	of	which	were	used	for	training	
flights	 and	 some	 for	maintenance	flights.	The	 court	 allowed	
deductions for the costs of operating the airplane to the extent 
the	 taxpayer	demonstrated	a	business	purpose	for	 the	flights.	
However, because the business use of the plane did not exceed 
the personal use of the plane, the court held that the taxpayer 
was properly denied expense method depreciation for the plane. 
Peterson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2015-1.
 CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The taxpayer and spouse 
purchase 456 acres of ranchland and granted a conservation 
easement	over	180	acres	of	the	property	in	2003.	The	land	was	
subject to a deed of trust securing an installment agreement 
of the purchase of the land. A subordination agreement was 
signed	by	the	note	holder	in	2005.	The	IRS	denied	a	charitable	
deduction for the easement, arguing that the easement was 
not granted in perpetuity at the time of the grant because the 
subordination agreement was not signed in the year of the 
grant of the easement. The taxpayer argued that the chance of 
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a	foreclosure	of	the	mortgage	was	so	remote	as	to	be	negligible;	
therefore, the grant was enforceable in perpetuity. The taxpayer 
argued that the subordination agreement was not required if the 
chance of a foreclosure of the mortgage was so remote as to be 
negligible. The court held that both requirements of Treas. Reg. § 
1.170A-14(g)(2),	(3)	needed	to	be	met	in	order	for	the	easement	
to	be	granted	in	perpetuity	sufficient	for	eligibility	for	a	charitable	
deduction.	The	appellate	court	affirmed.	Mitchell v. Comm’r, 
2015-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,130 (10th Cir. 2015), aff’g, 
138 T.C. 324 (2012). 
 CORPORATIONS
	 	 DISREGARDED	ENTITIES.	The	taxpayer	was	a	foreign	
owned	subsidiary	of	a	U.S.	corporation	and	intended	to	elect	to	
be treated as a disregarded entity. The taxpayer failed to timely 
file	a	valid	Form	8832,	Entity Classification Election, to elect to 
be treated as a disregarded entity for federal tax purposes. The 
IRS	granted	an	extension	of	time	to	file	the	Form	8832.	Ltr. Rul. 
201501001, Aug. 20, 2014.
 DEPLETION. The taxpayer was employed by an oil company 
to purchase oil and gas rights to real property. A portion of the 
taxpayer’s compensation came from bonuses calculated as a 
percentage of the net income from the oil and gas properties 
purchased by the taxpayer for the company. The taxpayer initially 
reported	the	bonus	income	as	ordinary	income	but	filed	amended	
returns claiming the bonuses as capital gains and depletion 
deductions. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1 provides that a depletion 
deduction	may	 only	 be	 taken	 by	 an	 owner	 of	 an	 “economic	
interest”	in	the	mineral	deposits	which	is	acquired	by	investment	
in the mineral in place and which is returned through the 
extraction of the mineral. The taxpayer argued that the taxpayer 
made an investment of skill, time and experience in acquiring 
the oil and gas properties for the employer. The court held that 
an economic interest cannot be acquired only by investment of 
time,	skill	and	experience	but	much	require	an	outlay	of	capital;	
thus, the taxpayer did not have an economic interest in the oil 
and gas which could be depleted and was eligible for a depletion 
deduction. The court also noted that the second requirement of 
Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1 was not met by the taxpayer’s bonuses 
in that the bonuses were not paid from the extraction of oil and 
gas	but	were	paid	as	an	incentive	for	the	taxpayer	to	find	more	
properties. Gaudreau v. United States, 2015-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 50,126 (D. kan. 2014).
 LETTER RULINGS.	 The	 IRS	 has	 issued	 its	 annual	 list	
of procedures for issuing letter rulings. Appendix A contains a 
schedule of user fees for requests. Rev. Proc. 2015-1, 2015-1 
C.B. 1. 
The	IRS	has	issued	its	annual	revision	of	the	general	procedures	
relating to the issuance of technical advice to a director or an 
appeals	area	director	by	the	various	offices	of	the	Associate	Chief	
Counsel. The procedures also explain the rights a taxpayer has 
when	a	field	office	requests	technical	advice.	Rev. Proc. 2015-2, 
2015-1 C.B. 105.
				The	IRS	has	issued	its	annual	list	of	tax	issues	for	which	the	
IRS	will	not	give	advance	rulings	or	determination	letters.	Rev. 
Proc. 2015-3, 2015-1 C.B. 129.
	 The	IRS	has	 issued	its	annual	 list	of	procedures	for	 issuing	
letter rulings involving exempt organizations. Rev. Proc. 2015-4, 
2015-1 C.B. 144.
	 The	 IRS	has	 released	 an	 updated	 revenue	 procedure	which	
explains	 when	 and	 how	 the	 IRS	 issues	 technical	 advice	
memoranda in the employee plans areas (including actuarial 
matters) and exempt organizations areas.  Rev. Proc. 2015-5, 
2015-1 C.B. 186.
	 The	IRS	has	issued	procedures	for	issuing	determination	letters	
on	qualified	 status	of	 employee	plans	under	 I.R.C.	 §§	401(a),	
403(a),	409	and	4975.	Rev. Proc. 2015-6, 2015-1 C.B. 194.
	 The	IRS	has	issued	a	revised	revenue	procedure	which	provides	
guidance	for	complying	with	the	user	fee	program	of	the	Internal	
Revenue Service as it pertains to requests for letter rulings, 
determination letters, etc., on matters under the jurisdiction of the 
Commissioner,	Tax	Exempt	and	Government	Entities	Division;	
and requests for administrative scrutiny determinations under Rev. 
Proc. 93-41, 1993-2 C.B. 536. Rev. Proc. 2015-8, 2015-1 C.B. 
235.
 OIL AND GAS LEASE. The taxpayers purchased property 
in	1996	and	1998	which	had	expiring	oil	and	gas	leases.	After	
the old leases expired, the taxpayers entered into new oil and 
gas leases and received a bonus payment for entering the leases. 
The	leases	entitled	the	taxpayers	to	16	percent	of	the	net	profits	
from any oil and gas extracted under the leases. The taxpayers 
claimed the bonus payment as long-term capital gain. The court 
held that the bonus payment was ordinary income to the taxpayers 
because the taxpayers retained an interest in the oil and gas 
extracted. The court also held that the taxpayers could not claim 
any depletion deduction against the bonus payment because the 
taxpayers failed to provide any evidence of the amount of royalties 
they	expected	from	the	leases.	The	appellate	court	affirmed	in	a	
decision designated as not for publication. Dudek v. Comm’r, 
2015-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,124 (3rd Cir. 2014), aff’g, 
T.C. Memo. 2013-272.
 PASSIVE ACTIVITy LOSSES. The taxpayers, husband 
and wife, owned a three apartment building next door to their 
residence. The husband was an unemployed and disabled military 
veteran and did all of the management of the apartments. The 
activities included daily inspection of the property, collection 
of rents, scheduling repairs, obtaining new renters, managing 
accounts	 and	making	 small	miscellaneous	 repairs.	The	 IRS	
disallowed	deductions	for	losses	in	excess	of	the	I.R.C.	§	469(i)	
offset,	 reduced	by	 the	 income	phaseout	provisions	of	 I.R.C.	§	
469(i)(3).	The	 taxpayers	argued	 that	 the	husband	qualified	 for	
the	exception	for	real	estate	professionals	as	provided	by	I.R.C.	
§	 469(c)(7)(B).	The	 court	 noted	 that	 the	 husband’s	 disability	
required additional time for the husband to complete most 
activities.  Based on the credible testimony of the taxpayers, the 
court found that the husband spent at least 650 hours per year 
on maintenance alone. The other activities were found to be 
sufficient	to	demonstrate	that	the	husband	spent	more	than	750	
hours	per	year	on	the	rental	activity	and	qualified	as	a	real	estate	
professional;	therefore,	the	taxpayers	were	entitled	to	deduct	the	
full rental activity losses. Lewis v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 
2014-112.
 PROPERTy TAXES. The taxpayer was a limited liability 
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company (LLC) created for the purpose of constructing and 
leasing the residential portion of buildings above city schools. 
Under	an	agreement	with	the	state,	the	taxpayer	made	payments	
to the public landlord of each property instead of real property 
taxes.	The	IRS	ruled	that	the	taxpayers	were	permitted	to	deduct	
as	real	property	taxes	under	I.R.C.	§	164	these	payments	in	lieu	
of	taxes	(PILOT).	The	PILOT	payments	satisfied	the	three-prong	
test articulated in Rev. Rul. 71-49, 1971-1 C.B. 103 because they: 
(1) were measured by and imposed at the same rate as applicable 
real	property	taxes	were	imposed;	(2)	were	imposed	pursuant	to	
a	state	statute;	and	(3)	the	PILOT	payments	could	only	by	used	
for	public	purposes.	In	addition,	the	subsequent	unit	owners	were	
entitled	to	deduct	as	real	property	taxes	under	I.R.C.	§	164	such	
portion of common charges paid as were applicable toward the 
PILOT	obligations.	Ltr. Rul. 201452015, Sept. 16, 2014.
 RETURNS.	The	IRS	has	announced	that	it	will	begin	accepting	
2014 tax returns electronically on January 20, 2015. Paper tax 
returns will begin processing at the same time.  The decision 
follows	Congress	renewing	a	number	of	“extender”	provisions	
of the tax law that expired at the end of 2013. IR-2014-119.
 S CORPORATION
	 	 EMPLOYEE	STOCK	OWNERSHIP	PLAN.	The	taxpayer	
was a wholly-owned corporation which elected S corporation 
status. The taxpayer sponsored an employee stock ownership plan 
(ESOP) managed by a trust and with the shareholder as the only 
participant. The ESOP was initially funded with a $200,000 loan 
which was used to purchase the taxpayer’s stock, which was used 
as security for the loan and held by the trust in a suspense account. 
The	ESOP	incorporated	the	anti-abuse	requirements	of	I.R.C.	§	
409(p) because the trust held stock of taxpayer, an S corporation. 
The	ESOP	provided:	“No	portion	of	the	Trust	Fund	attributable	to	
(or allocable in lieu of) Company Stock in an S corporation may, 
during	a	“nonallocation	year,”	accrue	(or	be	allocated	directly	or	
indirectly under any plan maintained by the Employer meeting 
the	requirements	of	Code	Section	401(a))	for	the	benefit	of	any	
disqualified	person.”		During	2002	the	trust	owned	80	percent	of	
the taxpayer’s common stock and the shareholder owned the rest. 
The ESOP allocated shares of taxpayer’s stock to the shareholder 
in 2002. At that time the taxpayer was treating the ESOP as a 
qualified	plan	under	I.R.C.	§	401(a)	and	the	trust	as	tax	exempt	
under	 section	 501(a).	 In	 2002	 the	 trust	made	 or	was	 credited	
with making a payment to petitioner toward the loan. The trust 
then	 released	 from	 the	 suspense	 account	 8.4568	 shares	 of	 the	
taxpayer’s stock, all of which were allocated to the shareholder. 
The shareholder was the taxpayer’s sole employee and the ESOP’s 
sole	 participant.	The	 IRS	determined	 in	 the	 deficiency	notice	
that	the	trust	had	violated	I.R.C.	§	409(p)	for	2002	by	releasing	
the taxpayer’s shares from the suspense account and allocating 
them	to	the	shareholder.		The	IRS	concluded	that	the	taxpayer	
owed	excise	tax	of	under	I.R.C.	§	4979A	and	determined	in	the	
deficiency	notice	 that	 the	 taxpayer	was	 liable	 for	 additions	 to	
tax	under	I.R.C.	§§	6651(a)	and	(b)	because	the	taxpayer	neither	
paid	excise	tax	for	2002	nor	filed	a	Form	5330,	Return of Excise 
Taxes Related to Employee Benefit Plans. The taxpayer argued 
that	the	ESOP	was	not	a	qualified	plan	but	the	court	noted	that	the	
quoted language above tracked exactly the language needed for a 
qualified	plan.	Although	the	taxpayer	violated	the	S	corporation	
rules because it had two classes of stock, the court held that 
the taxpayer would be deemed an S corporation because the 
taxpayer	and	shareholder	filed	all	returns	as	if	the	taxpayer	was	
an S corporation. Thus, the court held that the shareholder was 
a	disqualified	person	because	the	shareholder	held	more	than	10	
percent of the stock of the S corporation taxpayer. Therefore, the 
court held that the distribution of the stock from the trust to the 
shareholder was an impermissible allocation subject to excise 
tax. Ries Enterprises, Inc. v. Comm’r, 2015-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 50,131 (8th Cir. 2014), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2014-14.
	 	 LATE	 FILING	 PENALTY.	The	 taxpayer	was	 a	 single	
shareholder subchapter S corporation. The taxpayer’s Form 1120S 
return	were	filed	by	an	employee-officer	who	had	not	filed	timely	
returns for 2002 through 2012. For the 2010 return, the taxpayer 
claimed	 that	 the	officer	mailed	 a	Form	7004,	Application for 
Automatic Extension of Time To File Certain Business Income 
Tax, Information, and Other Returns, on March 15, 2011, the due 
date for the 2010 return. The extension, if valid, terminated on 
September	15,	2011	but	the	IRS	did	not	receive	the	2010	Form	
1120S	until	January	31,	2012.	The	IRS	had	no	record	of	receipt	
of	the	Form	7004	and	assessed	a	late	filing	penalty	under	I.R.C.	
§	6699	based	on	the	failure	to	file	the	2010	return	until	January	
2012.	The	taxpayer	claimed	that	the	extension	was	timely	filed	
and, at worst, the taxpayer was liable for only one month of 
penalty	because	the	2010	Form	1120S	was	filed	in	October	2011,	
one month after the termination of the extension.  The court held 
that the extension was not effective because the taxpayer provided 
no	evidence	of	the	mailing	of	the	Form	7004	other	than	testimony	
of	the	officer.	Similarly,	the	court	held	that	the	Form	1120S	for	
2010	was	not	filed	until	January	2012	because	the	taxpayer	failed	
to	 provide	 any	 evidence	of	 an	 earlier	filing.	Roshdieh, M.D. 
Corp. v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2014-113.
	 	 SUBSIDIARY	 ELECTION.	 The	 taxpayer	 was	 an	 S	
corporation which wholly-owned a subsidiary corporation. 
Although the taxpayer intended to treat the subsidiary as a 
qualified	subchapter	S	subsidiary,	 the	 taxpayer	 failed	 to	file	a	
Form	8869,	Qualified Subchapter S Subsidiary Election.	The	IRS	
granted	an	extension	of	time	for	the	taxpayer	to	file	Form	8869.	
Ltr. Rul. 201450012, Aug. 19, 2014.
  The taxpayer elected to be a subchapter S corporation. A 
subsidiary was formed which also made an election to be a 
subchapter	S	corporation.	As	part	of	a	reorganization	under	I.R.C.	
§	368(a)(1)(F),	the	shareholders	of	the	subsidiary	contributed	all	
of their stock in the subsidiary to the taxpayer, thereby causing the 
subsidiary to become a wholly-owned subsidiary of the taxpayer. 
The subsidiary then converted to a limited liability company, 
and by default was treated as a disregarded entity for federal 
tax purposes. Afterwards, the taxpayer made an election to treat 
the	 subsidiary	 as	 a	 qualified	 subchapter	S	 subsidiary	 (QSub).	
However, the taxpayer discovered that its election to treat the 
subsidiary	 as	 a	QSub	was	 ineffective	 due	 to	 the	 subsidiary’s	
failure	to	meet	all	the	requirements	of	I.R.C.	§	1361(b)(3)(B)	at	
the time the election was made. The taxpayer represented that 
PROPERTy
 EASEMENT. The defendants owned a rural residence on 2.41 
acres which was subject to an easement granted to the plaintiffs 
who owned land-locked pastures neighboring the defendants. The 
easement	grant	stated:	“The	easement	granted	herein	shall	be	for	
ingress	and	egress	for	vehicular	and	pedestrian	traffic	and	utilities	
for	the	use	and	benefit	of	the	Dominant	Estate.”		The	plaintiffs	had	
acquired their land from an owner who had used the property as 
a	horse	farm	with	a	barn	and	pastures.	When	the	plaintiffs	began	
to clean up the barn area and install horse fencing, the defendants 
attempted to block access over the easement by digging holes and 
storing property on the easement and several times personally 
block access to the property. The plaintiffs sought an injunction 
preventing the defendants from such actions. The trial court granted 
a permanent injunction, ruling that the easement covered the 
defendants’ entire property but was limited to a reasonable amount 
of space as needed to move horses in and out of the plaintiffs’ 
property, including trucks and small machinery.   On appeal, the 
plaintiffs agreed that they would accept an easement over a strip 
of land on the edge of the property. The defendants argued on 
appeal that the ruling allowed the plaintiffs to expand their use 
of the easement to walk horses across the easement for use of the 
property as a pasture. The appellate court found that the evidence 
demonstrated that the plaintiffs’ property had been used as a horse 
farm	with	 pasture	when	 the	 easement	was	 granted;	 therefore,	
the  use of the easement to walk horses to the property was not 
a new use. The defendants also argued that permanent injunctive 
relief was improper in that the plaintiffs only intended to use the 
property as a horse pasture. The appellate court found that the 
evidence showed that the plaintiffs had expended time and money 
to improve their property for use by horses when the defendants 
started	blocking	access	to	the	easement;	therefore,	the	permanent	
injunction was proper.  Barnes v. Prairie Horse Farms, LLC, 
2014 Ind. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1694 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
IN THE NEWS
 DRONES.	“The	Federal	Aviation	Administration	has	granted	
a	Washington	 company	 (Advanced	Aviation	 Solutions	 LLC)	
an	 exemption	 to	 fly	 unmanned	 aerial	 vehicles	 (“UAVs”	 or	
“drones”)	 commercially	 for	 “precision	 agriculture”	 and	 “crop	
scouting”	 purposes.	 	 In	 general,	 FAA	 regulations	 prohibit	 any	
person	 from	 flying	 a	 UAV	 in	 national	 airspace	without	 an	
airworthiness	certification	(except	for	model	aircraft	flow	under	
the	“hobby”	aircraft	guidance	document).		A	person	may	seek	to	
avoid	airworthiness	certification	by	seeking	an	exemption	under	
Section 333 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 
(“FMRA”).”	Janzen Ag Law (blog), Jan. 8, 2015, http://www.
janzenaglaw.com/2015/01/faa-approves-ag-drone-flights-for-
one.html
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the	ineffective	QSub	election	was	inadvertent	and	not	the	result	
of tax avoidance or retroactive tax planning. The taxpayer further 
represented that no federal tax return of any person has been 
filed	inconsistent	with	a	valid	QSub	election	having	been	made.	
The subsidiary and the taxpayer agreed to make any adjustments 
required	by	the	IRS	consistent	with	the	treatment	of	the	subsidiary	
as	a	QSub.	The	IRS	granted	the	taxpayer	an	extension	of	time	to	
file	a	proper	election.	Ltr. Rul. 201501007, Sept. 16, 2014.
INSURANCE
 POLLUTANT. The plaintiffs owned and operated a dairy 
farm with around 600 dairy cows. The plaintiffs purchased a farm 
insurance property and personal liability policy from the defendant 
which covered scheduled property, including equipment for 
handling manure from the dairy operation. The policy expressly 
excluded	losses	resulting	from	the	“discharge,	dispersal,		seepage,	
migration, release, or escape of ‘pollutants’ into or upon land, 
water,	or	air”	and	“any	loss,	cost,	or	expense	arising	out	of	any	
... claim or suit by or on behalf of any governmental authority 
relating to testing for, ... cleaning up, removing, ... or in any way 
responding	to	or	assessing	the	effects	of	‘pollutants.’”	Pollutant	
is	defined	in	the	policy	as	“any	solid,	liquid,	gaseous	...	 irritant	
or	contaminant,	 including	...	waste.	Waste	includes	materials	to	
be	recycled,	reclaimed,	or	reconditioned,	as	well	as	disposed	of.”	
The plaintiffs used the covered equipment to spread manure on 
their	fields	pursuant	to	a	nutrient	management	plan	prepared	by	a	
certified	crop	agronomist	and	approved	by	the	Washington	County	
Land	and	Water	Conservation	Division.	However,	the	Wisconsin	
Department of Natural Resources notified the plaintiffs that 
manure from the plaintiffs’ farm had polluted a local aquifer and 
contaminated	their	neighbors’	water	wells.	When	several	neighbors	
demanded	compensation,	the	plaintiffs	notified	defendant	of	the	
claims. The defendant sought to deny coverage because the manure 
was	a	pollutant.	First,	the	court	noted	that	the	policy	definition	of	
pollutant was so broad as to include almost any substance which 
could be an irritant or cause damage in certain circumstances. 
Therefore,	the	court	followed	the	case	precedent	that	the	definition	
had	to	be	determined	“as	understood	by	a	reasonable	person	in	
the	position	of	 the	 insured.”	 	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 court	 found	 that	
the plaintiff would not consider manure to be a pollutant but as a 
nutrient	used	as	beneficial	to	production	of	agricultural	products	for	
use in the dairy. Therefore, the court held that the defendant could 
not deny coverage for damage caused by manure runoff. On appeal, 
the appellate court reversed in part and remanded, holding that 
manure was a pollutant in that is was undesirable, commonly held 
to be harmful and was not universally present. Thus, the pollution 
exclusion in the general farm coverage liability policy excluded 
coverage for the damage. Similarly, the pollution exclusion in 
the farm chemicals coverage excluded coverage for the same 
reason. However, the court held that coverage was included in the 
“Damage	to	Property	of	Others”	clause	because	manure	seepage	
was	specifically	covered.		Wilson Mutual Ins. Co. v. Falk, 2014 
Wis. LEXIS 956 (Wis. 2014), rev’g and rem’g, 844 N.W.2d 380 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2013).
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